

CHAPTER 10

The Shias of Pakistan: Mapping an Altruistic Genocide

Abbas Zaidi

INTRODUCTION

Altaf Hussain, a resident of Dera Ismael Khan and working in Peshawar as an assistant director of the Anti-Corruption Department, had been receiving threats from members of the proscribed Deobandi group ASWJ. On 13 December 2013, he did not return home from the office. His family members in Dera Ismail Khan contacted him in the evening as per their routine, but his phone was out of reach. They called repeatedly but could not establish contact with him. On the morning of 20 December, they were informed that his corpse had been found outside Mardan. His severed head and body parts were scattered all over the area.

Pakistan's media—print and electronic—uniformly blacked out the story. Only a local Dera Ismael Khan newspaper reported details of the tragedy (Ahmad, 21 December 2013).¹ People outside Dera Ismael Khan learned about Altaf Hussain's fate from Mr Anser Abbas, a family friend of Altaf Hussain. In 2009, Anser Abbas himself was a victim of terrorism when he lost both of his hands in a suicide bombing at a Shia religious procession in Dera Ismael Khan. He now tweets with his feet (Ghani, 10 February 2014).² The story of Anser Abbas also went unnoticed in the Pakistan media.

A. Zaidi (✉)

University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Here is another case. On the morning of 18 February 2013, Dr Ali Haider left home in his car to drop his 12-year-old son, Ali Murtaza, off at school.³ As he approached the Forman Christian College (Lahore) under-pass, four men riding two motorbikes closed in and sprayed the car with bullets. Once the car had stopped after hitting the roadside, the assassins walked up and shot Haider in the face and head multiple times. After that, they shot his son in the head and rode off. Haider was Pakistan's top eye specialist and at the time of his murder was a professor and Head of the Department of Ophthalmology at Lahore's General Hospital.

Within the month of February, Haider's murder was preceded by murders of hundreds of men, women, boys, girls and infants in various parts of Pakistan. Tragic as these killings were, no one—media, politicians, opinion-makers, social activists, NGOs or human rights organizations (including the Pakistan Human Rights Commission)—pointed out that all the people killed were Shias.

Thus, for a writer or researcher writing in the present or future about faith-based killing in Pakistan and basing their work on journalistic and other sources, the word “Shia” will be non-existent. In other words, no instance of Shia killing being evident, there is, or will be, no such thing as Shia killing, let alone Shia genocide.

This chapter is about Shia genocide in Pakistan. Since most of the available definitions of genocide are too general (see below), I seek to revisit the concept by redefining it with reference to the Shia genocide in Pakistan. I also propose a model of genocide that, it is hoped, will account for the general dynamics of genocide. I would like to make it explicit here that since the proposed definition and model are ‘new’, they should be noted for their tentativeness.

Another point I should like to make here is that in Pakistan the Shias are not the only community under a genocidal assault. The Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, and Barelvi Sunnis/Sufis have also been facing extreme persecution at the hands of Deobandi militants. However, the present study is about the Shias only.

METHODOLOGY

Studies carried out on genocide often do not adopt an explicit research methodology.⁴ The proposed model aims to account for the dynamics of genocide by drawing on Halliday's Systemic-Functional Linguistics (Halliday 1994). The central contention of Systemic-Functional Linguistics is based on the premise that language references reality, perceived or otherwise, in society. In

other words, various happenings are the result of people's engagement with the world around them or the 'goings-on', which, according to Halliday (1994, p. 106), is "people's most powerful impression of experience". This is the ideational function of language that embodies people's experience of the outer and inner worlds (Halliday 1971/1996, p. 58).

Happenings, however, are not immutable; they are given specific meaning by people because they want them to be understood in specific ways and, thus, wishing their interlocutors to take on "a complimentary role". This is the interpersonal or evaluative function. Halliday (1971/1996, pp. 58–59) elaborates on the interpersonal role thus:

the speaker is using language as a means of his own intrusion into the speech event: the expression of his comments, his attitudes, and evaluations, and also the relationship that he sets up between himself and the listener—in particular, the communication role that he adopts, of informing, questioning, greeting, persuading, and the like.

The happenings and their representations, however, have to be put across in certain ways. In other words, happenings have to be give prominence and foregrounding so that they dominate a given scenario. This is the textual function of language through which language creates "links with itself and with the situation; and discourse becomes possible, because the speaker or writer can produce a text and the listener or reader can recognise one" (Halliday 1971/1996, p. 59).⁵

Based on Halliday's systemic functions, the model given below will endeavour to show how genocide is planned, carried out, and justified. Briefly, a genocide is based on real or imagined happenings rooted in the past or present. "Facts" to incriminate a designated group are positioned in a way which justifies a genocidal campaign. The very act of designating a group (or blaming the victim) is an act of positioning. And, finally, the identity, beliefs and so on of the designated group are foregrounded in various ways to set the focus on its "crimes" and "immorality".

GENOCIDE: THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION

"Genocide" is an unfortunate term, which reveals the parochial approach of many a scholarly mind. For instance, Michael Ignatieff (2001, p. 25) refuses to accept that the black slavery which killed millions of African slaves was genocide. In his own words

slavery is called genocide, when—whatever else it was—it was a system to exploit the living rather than to exterminate them Genocide has no meaning unless the crime can be connected to a clear intention to exterminate a human group in whole or in part. Something more than rhetorical exaggeration for effect is at stake here. Calling every abuse or crime a genocide makes it steadily more difficult to rouse people to action when a genuine genocide is taking place.

Ignatieff presents a humane view of slavery. By his formulation, the human costs of slavery were just an epiphenomenon. The master was not so bad after all because he wanted his slaves to live a long, healthy life so that he could utilize their bodies. Ignatieff, *inter alia*, is not willing even to give a basic understanding of slavery—“whatever else it was”. He is unhappy with calling “every” abuse and crime genocidal. It can be argued that few descendants of the slaves today would find Ignatieff’s view of slavery acceptable. It may be asked: What about those slaves who ceased to be “useful” once past their physical prime? Was there a welfare system set up for them by their white masters? What about those who were not “useful” by birth because they had some disability? What if today a descendant of those slaves claims that their treatment constituted genocide? Will they be shut up because their claim (of genocide) is not in line with a definition that Ignatieff constructs?

Another unfortunate aspect of the traditional debate about genocide is its focus on the number of people physically eliminated. Hundreds of thousands of people have to be killed in order to qualify for the title. Otherwise, any debate about their status will hit one definitional snag after another, such as “carnage”, “massacre”, “violence”, “mayhem”, “bloodshed”, “bloodbath”, and even “incomplete genocide”. Thus Melson (1992, p. 3) defines partial genocide as “mass murder in order to coerce and to alter the identity and politics of the group, not to destroy it”.

As will be seen below, Melson cannot differentiate between mass killing and genocide, a distinction which is made by Waller (2007, p. 14), thus:

Scholars use two terms to classify the collective violence stemming from state-directed terrorism. *Mass killing* means killing members of a group without the intention to eliminate the whole group or killing large numbers of people without a definition of group membership. Collective violence means *genocide* when a specific group is systematically and intentionally targeted for destruction.

Rubenstein (2004, p. 2) gives the following definition of genocide:

Genocide might then be defined as the deliberate killing of most or all members of a collective group for the mere fact of being members of that group.

This may be called a numbers game—pseudoscientific positivism, at best—according to which the only criterion to qualify for genocide is the number of people killed. What if 49 percent of a targeted group are killed and 51 percent survive? According to Rubenstein's criterion, it will not be considered genocide. Ironically, in the same breath, Rubenstein (2004, p. 2) says:

Hitler killed far fewer European Jews than the number of Indians of North and South America in the century or so after European discovery in 1492.

Nevertheless, Rubenstein finds the killing of the Jews by the Nazis genocidal, but the killing of enormously far more Native Americans by the European settlers something else.

Many more scholars have been mesmerized by the fetish that genocide is no more than the actual killing of people. Pieter Drost (1959, p. 125), one of the earliest scholars of genocide, defined genocide as

the deliberate destruction of physical life of individual human beings by their membership of any human collectivity as such.

Thackrah's (2004, p. 104) definition is also about physical annihilation:

the systematic elimination of a group of people who have been designated by another community or by a government to be destroyed.

Most scholarly works on genocide reference the United Nations definition of genocide. The UN definition of genocide enshrined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, passed in December 1948, says that any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups, constitutes genocide:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily harm or mental harm to members of the group
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

- (d) Imposing measures to prevent births with the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Despite some of its good points, the UN definition can be termed selective at best. It was formulated as part of Western powers' agenda to control the world at the end of the Second World War. At the time of its formulation, political groups were deliberately excluded to please the then Soviet Union. Discussing the circumstances which led to the formulation of the UN definition of genocide, Hinton and O'Neill (2009, p. 4) observe:

The very concept and legal definition of genocide was forged in a highly politicised atmosphere, one that resulted in inclusions and exclusions and a moral gradation of atrocity. The destruction of political groups, while abhorrent, was written out of the convention and became something else, an implicitly lesser crime; cultural genocide similarly dropped from sight, eventually re-emerging in popular discourse as “ethnocide”.

Some scholars have tried to obfuscate genocide in pain-and-pleasure, quick-recovery terms. For instance, May (2010, p. 88) contends:

The lives [of genocide survivors] may well be enormously impoverished, but people will normally be able to form new social relationships and social rules partially to replace those lost by the genocidal campaign. Second, although the lives and deaths of the victims of genocide will be impoverished because of the loss of some group-based identification, perhaps even unaffected by what has occurred in the genocide. And, third, although genocide does affect the meaningfulness of both one's life and death, it is likely that there is still some meaning to life and death ever after genocide.

This is another unfortunate example of how an armchair scholar undermines the whole notion of genocide. Expressions such as “normally”, “identification”, and “ever after” will sound vacuous, even heartless, to someone who is a member of a group targeted by a genocidal campaign.

The problem with most of the scholars and writers on genocide is that most of them seem to have spent little time with survivors of a genocide. They often rely on second-hand information, and probably lack empathy about the people they study. Another problem is that many scholars do not seem to have properly conceptualized genocide.

Understanding the concept of genocide should involve probing it from various angles, locating it in its sociohistorical perspectives, and trying to uncover hidden histories behind it (see below).

The question is: Who is qualified to define genocide? Usually it is the powerful who dole out the title of “genocide” as a matter of favour or disfavour. Thus the entire Western world led by the USA dubbed Saddam Hussain a genocidal lunatic, but the US-backed President Suharto of Indonesia was applauded for “tackling” communism. The crimes committed in Latin America during the Cold War are not called genocidal because the perpetrators were US allies. The genocidal impulses of US allies such as Augusto Pinochet in Chile, Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, and Doc Duvalier in Haiti are “understandable”. The contras in Nicaragua could kill countless civilians with impunity (see, e.g., Chomsky and Dietrich 1999; Gellately and Kiernan 2003; Esparza et al. 2009; and Chomsky 2013) without any retribution. Genocide is certainly bad, but as long as the mass murderer is “our son of a bitch”, all is fine.⁶ This should explain why the Shia genocide has not attracted the attention of the USA and its allies in the West: any talk about the Shia genocide might perhaps create sympathy for Shia Iran. It will certainly incriminate Saudi Arabia, a US ally, which is the moving spirit behind the Shia genocide in Pakistan (see below).

It would not be difficult to see why a number of genocide scholars are fixated on the primacy of numbers in deciding what constitutes genocide. One credible explanation, I would like to argue, is that almost all the studies done on genocide have been *ex post facto*. It is not usual to report genocide as it happens.⁷ The use of the tense in Hinton’s (2002a, p. 1) chronicling of the history of genocide should prove this point:

With the rise of the nation-state and its imperialist and modernizing ambitions, tens of millions of “backward” or “savage” indigenous peoples *perished* from disease, starvation, slave labour, and outright murder. Sixty million others *were also annihilated* in the twentieth century, often after nation-states *embarked* upon lethal projects of social engineering intent upon eliminating certain undesirable and “contaminating” elements of population. The list of victim groups during this “Century of Genocide” is long. Some are well-known to the public—Jews, Cambodians, Bosnians, and Rwandan Tutsis. Others have been annihilated in greater obscurity—Hereros, Armenians, Ukrainian peasants, Gypsies, Bengalis, Burundi Hutus, the Ache of Paraguay, Guatemalan Mayans, and the Ogoni of Nigerian. [emphasis added]

This shows the benefit-of-hindsight nature of most of the studies on genocide. It should answer the question about where the present work is located in the corpus on genocide: it describes (is witness to) the Shia genocide as it is being carried out in Pakistan.⁸

It is not that there are no good definitions of genocide; far from it. For instance, Chalk and Jonassohn (1990, p. 23) say:

Genocide is a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrators.

This definition is not complete but it has a few important points: (1) genocide involves the victim and the perpetrator; (2) there is a power asymmetry between the two groups; (3) there is a formidably powerful institution backing the perpetrator; (4) it is the perpetrator who decides if the victim deserves to live or not; and (5) the victim faces potential destruction.

Shaw (2003, p. 34) defines genocide as:

Deliberate destruction of a people, principally but only by means of killing some of its members.

There are two outstanding features of this definition. First, genocide is deliberate, and since it is deliberate it is executed over a certain period.⁹ In other words, genocide is not a one-off incident. Second, genocide is not just the physical elimination of the victim. As I will try to show below, *genocide can be carried out without actually killing a member of a target group*.

Since this chapter is not about genocide in general but the genocide of the Shias of Pakistan, I would like to end this section with a few relevant remarks.

Given the limitation of the physical-eliminative notion, I propose that genocide be explored in ecological terms. Ecology, I will try to show below, is an all-inclusive concept. The ecology of genocide will include the post-traumatic lives of survivors and also the new (future) stage(s) in the history of genocide. An ecological view of genocide will mean that the notion should be studied phenomenologically: What is it like for the victim to live in a genocidal ecology? What is it like for a Shia to live in a society (i.e., Pakistan) where wall after wall has graffiti declaring *Kafir Kafir Shia Kafir*¹⁰? What is it like to pass by a mosque

or madrassa where loudspeakers at any time of the day shout fatwas that Shias are blasphemers, enemies of Islam, fitnah,¹¹ Jewish agents, and wajib-ul-qatal;¹² What kind of society do the Shias live in where Shia haters publicly and in the media justify Shia killing by declaring them apostate and heretics, and the state invokes no law to check them? What is the world like for a Shia who has survived a genocidal attack but is physically incapacitated? How does their mind function after escaping death? How many Shia children develop dissociative identity disorder because they live in a society where they are traumatized almost every day? What dreams about their future do they have? How do they regulate their “affective reactions”;¹³ What about the families of the Shias killed? How do they act out their lives economically, psychologically, and socially? What happens to their family structure?¹⁴

GENOCIDE: AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW

It is hoped that the preceding remarks clarify that genocide should not be confined to the people who are eliminated physically. The genocidal killing of members of a designated group at any given time is but a stage in a genocidal campaign. One genocidal act at a given moment brings about many repercussions. One way to engage with the phenomenon of genocide is to understand it in terms of injury recidivism. In their archaeological ethnographic-interpretative work, Harrod, Lienard, and Martin have argued that clinical data world over have shown that people who suffer significant injury are at greater risk of future injuries. This includes a fair amount of accidental trauma too. They (2012, p. 64) further say:

In intragroup conflict, nonlethal violence is similar to lethal violence in that the desired outcome of confrontation is to gain status or resources through the submission of other individual(s).

The argument of Harrod et al. can certainly be extended to a group that faces persistent discrimination, is regularly demonized, and lives in a state of permanent insecurity because any number of its members can be (indeed, are) fatally attacked without warning.

Most of the studies done on genocide unfortunately fail to address this issue.

Another way of looking at the phenomenon of genocide is not to discuss it in religious phraseology even if the victims are killed in the name

of religion. There is no denying the fact that genocide is an ethical issue. It is an extremely emotive issue too, and it evokes the Manichaean binary of good and evil. However, religious or moral metaphors lead to abstractions. Genocide, therefore, should be dealt with as a legal-human issue. Dying a natural death is a basic human right. Someone killed for their beliefs, race, or ethnicity is deprived of their human right of not only living out their natural span of life but also of their dreams, ideals, desires, and visions. Thus genocide is a crime and not a moral aberration. People cannot be prosecuted for their moral shortcomings. It is only when they commit crimes that they can be punished by society.

Last, collateral damage to various possessions of genocide victims should also be taken into account as part of genocide, such as the destruction of the victims' means of livelihood and dwelling.¹⁵ Here is an example, an eyewitness account,¹⁶ of how genocide is a combination of loss of the victim's life and of their possessions:

We have recently seen a horrible example of the Wahhabis' cruel fanaticism . . . Now the enormous wealth that has accumulated in the [mosques of Imam Hussain] . . . has been exciting the Wahhabis' avidity for a long time. They have been dreaming permanently of the looting of the town and were so sure of success that their creditors fixed the debt payment to the happy day when their hopes would come true. That day came at last . . . 12,000 Wahhabis suddenly attacked [the mosque of] Imam Hussain; after seizing more spoils than they had ever seized after their greatest victories they put everything to fire and sword . . . Old people, women and children—everybody died at the barbarians' sword. Besides, it is said that whenever they saw a pregnant woman, they disembowelled her and left the foetus on the mother's bleeding corpse. Their cruelty could not be satisfied, they did not cease their murders and blood flowed like water. As a result of the bloody catastrophe, more than 4,000 people perished. The Wahhabis carried off their plunder on the backs of 4,000 camels. After the plunder and murders, they destroyed the imam's mausoleum, and converted it into a cloaca of abomination and blood. They inflicted the greatest damage on the minarets and domes, believing that those structures were made of gold bricks. (Fatah 2008, p. 146)

Based on my examination of various genocidal campaigns, and with an eye on the Shia genocide in Pakistan, I would like to define genocide as *an altruistic, institutionalized assault on inner and outer lives of a largely defenceless group whose culpability is designated by the perpetrator*.

Below I present five points to clarify the definition. Given the focus of this work, I shall base my discussion mainly on examples from the Shia genocide in Pakistan:

Altruistic: Probably every genocidal campaign is of an argumentative-justificatory nature with moralistic warrants. In the perpetrators' discourse, words such as "killing" or "murder" seldom appear. The alibi for genocide posited is that some act or action taken by the perpetrators is based on some "higher" principle that may be for societal/social or religious/moral good. One way to approach the altruistic nature of genocide is to view it diachronically, which means that genocide is often not a one-off action; it has roots in history. The roots lie in a past incident or incidents which the perpetrator claims to be outrageous and unforgivable.¹⁷ The incident(s) can be of religious, political, economic, or even mythical nature, but the perpetrator claims it/them to be a matter of great significance.

The Shia genocide in Pakistan and elsewhere is based on the claim of the perpetrators that for hundreds of years the former have been insulting some revered personalities of Islam, including some of the wives of the Prophet Muhammad.¹⁸ The Shias are also blamed for waging wars against Sunni rulers in the past,¹⁹ thus the Deobandi claim that the Shias have historically been blasphemers and saboteurs (see below).²⁰

Given the altruistic nature of genocide, it can be claimed that it is fundamentally an obliterative project. Thus there is no room for the victim to live with the perpetrator in peaceful co-existence. The only way for the victim to live peacefully is to give up their lifestyle and/or belief system and adopt that of the perpetrator, or live as a second-class citizen.²¹ Thus it may be said that genocide is transformative because it seeks the victim's transformation one way or another.²²

The Shia killers in Pakistan, and elsewhere, are very categorical and uncompromising about wiping the Shias out of existence for being kafir. They openly claim that the Shias should either give up their "blasphemous" beliefs or get ready to be killed.²³

Institutionalized: The word "institution" covers a large terrain. First, the genocidal mind and intent are rooted in the ideological belief system of the perpetrator. The history of the relations between the perpetrator and the victim is based on and/or backed by widely accepted tracts and edicts that the victim's existence is unacceptable. "Institution" also means a powerful organization, often a state that puts its weight behind the perpetrator. Genocide is not possible without the patronage of a state or a very powerful organization. Sometimes

the state itself carries out genocide.²⁴ However, where a state is weak, non-state actors—states within a state—carry out genocidal violence. Brass (2003) claims that the genocidal violence in Punjab at the time of Partition had nothing to do with the state. He is, if at all, only partially correct. The violence was the result of the established British policy of divide and rule. Besides, at the time of Partition, the British state abandoned people to their fate, giving marauders and assassins complete impunity to act violently.²⁵

Historically there have been countless state-sanctioned fatwas against the Shias, declaring them infidels and unworthy of living. It has been because of these fatwas that the Shias have historically been indiscriminately killed, crushed, or pushed to extreme marginality in every society where they have lived with non-Shia Muslims. In Pakistan it is the state itself which has created Shia killers, and has been patronizing them.²⁶ All the main institutions of the state of Pakistan—such as the army, the judiciary, the press, and the political rulers—are complicit in the Shia genocide.²⁷ In Saudi Arabia and Bahrain too, it is the state which has been killing Shias with impunity. In the words of Rosen (2006, p. 182),

In Saudi Arabia, home to Wahabi Islam, Shias are known as *rafida*, or “rejectionists”. A highly pejorative term, it means that Shias are outside Islam. To Shias it is the equivalent of being called “nigger.” Zarqawi uses the word to describe Shias, as do many other Sunni radicals in the region. Saudi Arabia's Shias have been persecuted, prevented from celebrating their festivals, and occasionally threatened with extermination.²⁸

Inner and outer lives. This is the central point of the definition presented above. As I have tried to show in my discussion of various definitions of genocide, it is wrong to think it only in terms of physical elimination of the victim. The genocidal perpetrator aims to obliterate the victim's inner and outer lives. The perpetrator wants to destroy the culture and the soul of the victim. This is why ethnocide is part of genocide. Indeed, ethnocide is the softer side of genocide because its declared intent is not to kill the victim. Ethnocide

admits the relativity of evil in difference: others are evil, but we can improve them by making them transform themselves until they are identical, to the model we propose and impose. (Clastres 1994, p. 23)

Thus, if the victim is weaned away from their culture and is made to adopt the culture of the perpetrator, their identity and inner life cease to exist. In addition, as noted above, the victim living in a genocidal society lives in permanent fear and is constantly traumatized. It would not be hard to imagine that in such a condition the victim either becomes defensive with respect to their culture and beliefs, or begins to hate their community, its various practices, and, perhaps, themselves.²⁹ In any case, they experience helplessness and hopelessness:

Genocide in the generic sense is the mass killing of substantial numbers of human beings, when not in the course of military action against the military forces of an avowed enemy, under conditions of the essential defencelessness and helplessness of the victims. (Charny 1997, p. 86)

Clastres (1994, p. 44) has also noted:

Ethnocide is then the systematic destruction of the ways of living and thinking of people different from those who lead this venture of destruction. In sum, genocide assassinates people in their body, ethnocide kills them in their mind.³⁰

Whereas Clastres distinguishes genocide from ethnocide, I argue that ethnocide is part of genocide. I draw support for my view, for instance, from Manne, who says:

A national inquiry last year found that the [Australian] government policy of forced removal was a gross violation of human rights and technically an act of genocide because it has the intention of destroying Australia's indigenous culture by forced assimilation. (R. Manne cited by Martin and Rose 2003, p. 32)

The outer life has at least two aspects. First is the very physical existence which the genocidal perpetrator seeks to eliminate. This is pure murder. However, the other aspect of the outer life is about how an individual functions as part of society. The outer life is also the physical correlate of one's cultural and religious beliefs and practices.³¹ In a genocidal situation, the victim faces discrimination in various forms and at various levels. Thus they cannot carry out activities to which they are entitled as humans. The perpetrator robs the victim of their human essence. It is in this context that Card has claimed that genocide is "social death". To cite her,

Specific to genocide is the harm inflicted on its victims' social vitality. It is not just that one's group membership is the occasion for harms that are definable independently of one's identity as a member of the group. When a group with its own cultural identity is destroyed, its survivors lose their cultural heritage and may even lose their intergenerational connections. To use Orlando Patterson's terminology, in that event, they may become "socially dead" and their descendants "naturally alienated," no longer able to pass along and build upon the traditions, cultural developments (including languages), and projects of earlier generations. The harm of social death is not necessarily less extreme than that of physical death. Social death can even aggravate physical death by making it indecent, removing all respectful and caring rituals, social connections, and social contexts that are capable of making dying bearable and even of making one's death meaningful. In my view, the special evil of genocide lies in its infliction of not just physical death (when it does that) but social death, producing a consequent meaninglessness of one's life and even of its termination. (Card 2003, p. 73)

A view of a genocidal campaign carried out in the past or the present will amply show that the perpetrator's intention was as much destroying the mind and soul of the victim as destroying their body. Turkey is one significant example. It is one country which has historically carried out multiple genocides. The example of Turkey's Kurdish population is relevant here. The Kurds have not been allowed to use their own language for any meaningful activity other than day-to-day communication. Turkey did not allow the Kurds to publish anything in their language. They were not allowed to study Kurdish in school. No assault on a culture of a group is as far-reaching and destructive as banning its language.³² The wholesale killing of the natives by the Conquistadores went hand in hand with the banning of native religious and cultural practices. It would not be hard to argue that a religious-fanatic mind and a genocidal mind are more or less the same in their obsession with destroying the inner and outer lives of the victim group.

In Pakistan, the Shias find it hard to continue to carry out their religious and cultural practices. By holding a religious gathering, they put their lives on the line. Shia mosques, houses, and religious gatherings and processions are routinely bombed. They are allowed to hold gatherings and processions only in those places and areas where they have been doing so for decades. They are required to obtain a licence from the government to stage a procession or hold a gathering, called *majlis*. Having spoken to hundreds of Shias, I can safely claim that since General Zia ul Haq took over in July 1977, they have not been issued a single licence for a religious procession.

The entire cultural and educational scene of Pakistan aims to create a sense of irrelevance, marginality, and inferiority among the Shias. A few examples by way of illustration are in order here, such as the yearly literary festivals held in Karachi and Lahore. Every festival includes sessions on “literature and society” and “literature and politics”. In 2012, 2013, and 2014, the two festivals were preceded by Shia killings in Quetta and Karachi. In the various discussions held by the participants, the possibility of striking peace with the Taliban was discussed in a pros-and-cons spirit, but no mention was made of the Shia killings. A few people who tried to raise the issue were asked to leave. The media totally blacked out the fact that anyone tried to say a word about the Shia killings.³³ The Shia identity is so suspect that, even at a book fair, anything suspected to be Shia is not allowed to be displayed or sold. Even at International book fairs, a ‘Shia’ Iranian bookstall is forced to pack up and leave because there are “Shia books” on sale.³⁴

In Pakistan, “religious studies” and “Pakistan studies” are compulsory subjects up to college level. In these two subjects, every effort is made to destroy the Shia identity. In religious studies, students are told that the only proper ways of doing ablution, offering prayers, living like a true Muslim, and burying the dead are the Sunni ways. No recognition is given to the fact that Islam in Pakistan is not monolithic. The Shias constitute 20 percent of Pakistan’s population, but in the “Islamic studies” books they are not acknowledged, even as one of the sects making up Islam. In these books, Islam means everything which is non-Shia, even anti-Shia. Even in those areas where they are in the majority, Shia students are forced to read books which explicitly tell them that their way of praying and so forth is not the “proper Islamic” way. In this respect, the case of Gilgit-Skardu is significant where the Shias are in the majority, constituting 75 percent of the population. Shia students have been forced to read Islamic studies books which portray them as heretics. When in 2000 the Shias demanded the removal of controversial content from the textbooks, scores of them, including their community leaders, were killed by the security forces. The Shia areas were placed under curfew and the students were not allowed to enter schools and colleges for a year. Their economic lives were curtailed too. It took them almost five years to change the highly offensive contents.³⁵

Apart from the religious rituals, the inner lives of Shias are attacked in another way. Pakistan society is awash with national heroes who happen to be those Muslim warriors who in the past conquered and/or ruled India. As Ahmed has pointed out, every hero promoted in various forums—media,

schools, cultural shows and festivals—was a Shia killer.³⁶ In addition to the warrior-heroes, Pakistani textbooks have “Islamic” heroes too. These are theologians of yore, such as Shah Waliullah and Sheikh Ahmed Sirhindi, who spent their lives preaching not only hatred of Shias but also their physical annihilation.³⁷ The intensity of anti-Shia curricula in Pakistanis has led to the majority of students of Pakistan’s universities regarding the Shias as kafirs.³⁸

Largely defenceless: The victim group is largely defenceless.³⁹ It is possible that the victim can put up a fight in some circumstances, such as a place/area where the victim community has a significant number of people. However, in the overall scenario of genocide, it matters little. The victim group is defenceless and is at the mercy of the perpetrator.

As a result of the incessant killings of Shias, especially Shia doctors in the early 1990s, some Shia youths formed a group called Sipah-e-Muhammad (the Soldiers of Muhammad), which offered resistance to the SSP (the Soldiers of the Companions of the Prophet). Some Shias claim that the Soldiers of Muhammad was created by Pakistan’s intelligence agencies to bring a bad name to the Shias to prove that they were also capable of violence. However, even if the Soldiers of Muhammad was a genuinely Shia resistance group, it was officially banned in 2001, and its leaders and activists were either killed or jailed without any legal process or procedure being followed. One of its leaders, Ghulam Raza Naqvi, spent 18 years in jail (1996–2014) without ever being charged. No publication, no human rights group, and no politicians ever raised a voice about him.⁴⁰

Victim’s culpability. That the victim’s culpability—or crime or sin—is defined by the perpetrator is indicative of the immense power of the latter. One way to do this is to identify the victim in sinful or criminal terms. Dabag (2005, p. 52) has put it clearly thus:

The exertion of violence and its authorization are also closely related to the construction of collective identity in the perpetrator society. Thus, the study of genocide and identity raises two issues: for the victims, suffering from genocide implies a multitude of discontinuities, injuries, and losses. The experience of extreme physical and psychological violation not only leads to long-term traumatic effects which are passed on to following generations, but also to the radical destruction of their identities. This kind of destruction, however, is not a mere side effect of genocidal violence, but rather its primary objective.

Since the perpetrators are powerful, they can construct ‘facts/truths’ about their victims which justify genocide.⁴¹ The perpetrator’s power to

inscribe a specific identity on the victims also robs them of their dignity that, *inter alia*, is a violation of their basic human rights:

human persons possess an inherent dignity by virtue of the properties of their existent personal being. Simply by being the kinds of creatures they are ontologically, persons are characterized by real dignity. Dignity is not an extra benefit conferred upon persons by social contract or positive law. Dignity is not the culturally relative invention of some people who socially construct it in their minds and discourse. Dignity is a real, objective feature of human personhood. (Smith 2010, p. 434)

The Shias claim to be Muslims because they believe in all of the basic five fundamental doctrines of Islam, like other Islamic sects.⁴² However, the Shia killers, given their sheer power and backing by the state of Pakistan,⁴³ have forced a different identity on them: they are kafir. Had Dr Ali Haider converted to, say, the Deobandi sect of Islam, he would have become a hero, a poster boy of the Deobandis, purified of all sins for having been a Shia in the past, and his life would have been spared. However, he would have ceased to be a Shia. Similarly, if, for the sake of argument, all the Shias of Pakistan were to give up their beliefs as demanded by the Deobandis, they would not be killed, but their Shia identity, and various cultural and denominational practices, would be wiped out of existence. In other words, without a single Shia being killed, the genocide of the Shias would be complete. This should support my claim above that genocide is possible without any actual killing taking place. Reducing the life chances of a group will result in its disappearance qua group eventually. An all-out assault on a group's inner life will obliterate every other aspect of that life.


MODELING GENOCIDE

Consequent to the above discussion, it is perhaps possible to work out a model for the concept of genocide. I propose the following model, which, I would like to claim, covers almost the entire range of the concept (Fig. 10.1).

Ideational Grounding

This refers to the provenance and locale of a given instance of genocide. Genocidal violence seeks its justification in some actual or perceived historical incident and is perpetuated on certain people in a

Fig. 10.1 Genocide model



certain place or places. The grounding can be epistemological. For instance, the genocidal violence against the Shias is as old as the 1400-year history of Islam. The justification for the violence is based upon the persecutors' claim that the Shias insult some companions of the Prophet Muhammad. The 'insult' originated in the succession dispute after the death of the Prophet (for a concise account of the origins of the dispute, see Hazleton 2009). The Shias at that time supported the unsuccessful succession claim of Ali bin Abu Talib, the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law. To this day, the Shias argue that the claim of Ali bin Abu Talib was more legitimate than that of those who succeeded the Prophet.⁴⁴

It is interesting to note that the Shias are killed not because they have any disagreement with other Muslims over any of the fundamentals of Islam; they are killed because they do not accept the legitimacy of some of the companions of the Prophet to rule over more than 1,000 years ago. Thus the Shias and their homes, workplaces, mosques, bodies, and mind have become hostage to an epistemological ideational grounding (see below).

Evaluative Positioning

One way of positioning the victims is to deny that their genocide is taking place, or has ever taken place. For instance, an outright denial is made: no such thing as genocide is taking place. This is done by denying the very identity, which is the very cause of genocide, of the victims. Another way of denying genocide is to claim that some people of a certain group are being killed, but they are either killed at random—that is, the killing is not systematic—or the number is too low to qualify as genocide. By not reporting the identity of the victims, the denier puts an irrelevant gloss on the killing in question.

Another way to position an issue in question is to adopt cognitive vagueness about it. This is done by adopting a twisted axiology. In the context of the Shia genocide, it is done in many ways. One way is to explain the Shia genocide by creating a false Shia–Sunni binary—that is, it is a Shia-versus-Sunni conflict. The Shia genocide in Pakistan is being carried out not by Sunnis but by Deobandis. More than 55 percent of Pakistanis are Barelvi Sunnis. The Deobandi Sunnis make up 20 percent. Those journalists who call the Shia genocide a Shia–Sunni conflict are in fact guilty of creating false perspectives from which to view the issue. A few more ways of creating obfuscation are (1) to call the violence against the Shias a ramification of the Iran–Saudi conflict in the Middle East; (2) to claim that the anti-Shia violence is a result of the US drone attacks following 9/11 (since the Deobandi Taliban cannot strike back at the Americans, they attack the Shias); and (3) the Shia killers are well-meaning but misguided Muslims—‘our people’—who can be convinced to scale back their ‘militancy’.

Validatory hermeneutics, or justification of the Shia genocide, is posited through ‘persuasive’ argumentation. Such argumentation is based on jurisprudence, theology, and nationalism. In accordance with such validatory hermeneutics, the argument that blasphemers and infidels have to be put to the sword is naturalised. Through the twisted exegesis of ‘authoritative’ sources, murder is justified. It is also justified because of nationalism: the Shias of Pakistan are ‘agents’ of Shia Iran who have secretly been gnawing at the foundations of Pakistan.

The justification of genocide is also couched in other terms, such as ridiculing the victims or giving Marxist and psychological explanations of the motives behind killing (see below for more on Marxist view of the Shia genocide).

Thematic Representation

In a genocidal campaign, the victims’ beliefs and practices are foregrounded in terms that portray them as hostile to and incompatible with those of their tormentors. The commonalities that can bring the tormentors and their victims together are backgrounded.

There are five basic tenets of Islam: *shahadah* (belief that Allah is the only deity and Muhammad was his messenger); *salat* (daily prayers); *zakat* (charity); fasting; and *hajj* (a Muslim must perform the pilgrimage at least once). There are other tenets that must be accepted: belief in the holy

books; belief in the prophets who preceded Prophet Muhammad; belief in the angels; and belief in the Day of Judgment.

All Shias follow the above tenets. However, they do not accept the legitimacy of Abu Bakr, Umer, and Usman, who ruled the Islamic world after the Prophet Muhammad's death. They accept the legitimacy of Ali bin Abu Talib, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, who succeeded Abu Bakr, Umer, and Usman. The Shias also claim that not all of the companions of the Prophet were perfect human beings who could make no mistakes.

No acknowledgement is made that the Shias believe in the basic tenets of Islam just like the Sunnis. In the genocidal campaign against the Shias, the Deobandis give thematic foregrounding to the Shia 'blasphemy' that is their refusal to accord legitimacy to the abovementioned rulers. The Shia identity created is that of a blasphemer who wants to destroy Islam by undermining some of the companions of the Prophet. It is based upon such identification of the Shias that thousands of Deobandi fatwas exist that apostatize them and call for their physical and social death.⁴⁵

SHIA GENOCIDE IN PAKISTAN

Before 1947, Pakistan was part of India. The Shias were indiscriminately killed by the Muslim rulers of India before the arrival of the British. This is not the place to trace the history of the Shia genocide before 1947, that is, the establishment of Pakistan. The point is that those who became Pakistanis after 1947 were the same people who had lived in undivided India. After the establishment of Pakistan, the Shias were killed for their beliefs, but it was on 3 June 1963 that the very first organized assault was launched on them. It was an Ashura mourning procession which was attacked by a group of Wahhabi Muslims. They attacked Shia men and boys with meat cutters, long knives, and sickles, killing at least 118. Later they cut the Shias into pieces and then collected whatever was left of them and set their remains on fire. Before the police arrived, most of the Shias had been burned to ashes. In those days there was no television channel in Pakistan and there were only a handful of newspapers, mostly controlled by the government. The following day, the Shia killing was reported thus:

Ashura was marred by sectarian clashes in Lahore and a Khairpur village, Theri, yesterday, taking toll of some lives. Many were injured and admitted to hospitals.

The reporting of the genocidal attack on the Shias of Khairpur is evidence that the denial, obfuscation, and justification of the Shia genocide in Pakistan are not a new phenomenon. The above report gives the impression that (1) two equally powerful parties clashed; (2) the clash was deliberate and planned on both sides; (3) both parties were equally guilty; (4) both parties suffered casualties; and (5) there were not many casualties. In addition, the site of the Shia killing is just ‘a’ village in a remote and thus unimportant place. To this day, the Theri massacre has not been chronicled or referenced in any Pakistani publication. It is only recently that the Amnesty International has referred to it.⁴⁶

Since 1963 the Shias have been routinely killed, but it was after the 1979 Afghan Jihad, a Saudi-US project, that the Shia genocide was set in a steady motion (Coll 2005). The US objective was to undermine the Soviet Union. For Saudi Arabia, it was an ideal opportunity to spread its exclusivist Salafi/Wahhabi ideology. In the words of Firdous (2009, p. 112),

The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979 can be considered as the starting point of Saudi financing to Sunni Muslims fighting for religious or political goals. That war in particular was the occasion to affirm Wahhabism as the “true belief”, in sharp contrast to the atheism promoted by “infidel” communists and the “deviating” Islam followed by Sufis and Shiites.

Since then, Pakistani Shias have been killed in massive numbers. There are various claims that put the number of the Shias killed in tens of thousands. The appendices in this book chronicle incidents of Shia killings, but these numbers are not accurate because they depend on the figures given by Pakistan’s mainstream newspapers, but the Pakistani media has been less than truthful about Shia killings. It can safely be assumed that the actual number of Shias killed is far greater than is given in the reports and press data.⁴⁷ Based on the analyses presented here and elsewhere in this book, the partiality of the media should be clear. One way to find out about the lies of the Pakistani media regarding the Shia genocide is to compare its reporting to that of Shia websites, and find out how extensively the former under-reports Shia killing. Unfortunately, these websites have been established only recently. The oldest is Let Us Build Pakistan (LUBP), which was set up in 2008. Thus there is no way of finding out how many Shias have actually been killed.

Mutilative Violence and Intellecticide

The individual body, Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1987, p. 31) argue, is:

the most immediate terrain where social truths and social contradictions are played out ... as well as the locus of personal and social resistance and struggle.

Physical violence is symbolic violence too. Killing, in addition to being a physical act, is also an ideological act too. Apart from being killed indiscriminately through remote control and suicide bombings, the nature of selective killing of the Shias is very significant. Selective killing has a duality: the Deobandis kill the finest of the Shia minds. In the early 1990s the Deobandis killed hundreds of the top Shia doctors. The likes of Dr Ali Haider, the advocate Shakir Rizvi,⁴⁸ the scholar-theologian Allama Nasir Abbas,⁴⁹ Allama Alim-Al Musavi, Professor Dr Shabiul Hassan,⁵⁰ the poet and educator Sibte Jafar Zaidi,⁵¹ Professor Dr Shabih of Gujrat University, Sindh High Court lawyer Kausar Saqlain,⁵² Professor Saifuddin Jafari,⁵³ engineer Muntazir Mehdi,⁵⁴ Allama Taqi Hadi Naqvi,⁵⁵ and the poet Mohsin Naqvi were the very best in their respective professions.⁵⁶ By carrying out the Shia intellecticide, the killers want to reduce the Shia community into a semiliterate, insignificant minority which has no cerebral vitality and no ability to perform creatively. In Perez's (2012, p. 26) words,

By killing young and old alike and reducing them to unrecognized mass, the aggressors create a substantial psychological import on the regional interaction sphere in which they are operating.

The Shia intellecticide is not without its message, and this is the other side of the duality: all of the Shia minds mentioned above were shot in the face and head in such a manner that their faces became a mass of flesh and bone. By killing them in such a brutal manner, the message was clear: their mutilated corpses have been a symbol of total defeat and humiliation of the Shia community.⁵⁷ Whereas a mutilated body symbolizes the obliteration of the person killed, to the rest of the victim community it is a message about its helplessness, degradation, and inferiority. The perpetrator's ability to strike at will and get away with it is a taunt, and also a reminder to the victim community about its impotence. By so brutally wasting the finest of the Shia minds, the killers notify their insignificance: they are as

expendable as flies. Perhaps what is intellecticide to the Shias is no more than insecticide to the Deobandis.⁵⁸ Mutilated corpses of men, women, children, and infants frequently littered on the road are another message: litter. A mutilated corpse symbolizes a posthumous assault on it because it cannot be buried in the normal way. Genocidal killing—that is, killing fellow human beings—is cannibalistic because it feeds the perpetrator's lust for power over the victim. And when the media, the government, and various human rights groups deny, obfuscate, and even justify their genocide, it is a message to the Shias not only that they are an insignificant group, but also that their belief system and culture have no place in Pakistan.

Shia Genocide: Some Examples

Pakistan's mainstream publications and television channels have never taken up the issue of the Shia genocide in a meaningful way. As I try to show here, there is no way for a researcher to find out exactly how many Shias have been killed as a result of the faith-based violence against them. Nishapuri has compiled a list of the Shias killed by the Deobandis and the Salafis from 1963 to May 2015. He claims that more than 25,000 have been killed.⁵⁹ Despite being a commendable effort, the list gives only a partial view of the Shia genocide because it is based on published reports in Pakistan's mainstream newspapers. As I have indicated at the beginning of this chapter, and exemplified in Chapter 4 on the media, Pakistan's media goes out of its way not to report Shia killing. These are reported only when a number of Shias are killed, or when they are killed as a result of attacks on their mourning processions. One way to find out if a person who has been killed is a Shia is to look for their surname. Again, Pakistan's media often omits the last name of the victim if they happen to be Shia.⁶⁰

As I have indicated above, the Shia genocide in Pakistan is ongoing, and, given the apostatizing Deobandi-theological foundations, it will go on. Added to this are the anti-Shia pathologies of oil-rich Middle Eastern oligarchies—(*oligarchies*)—such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, so there may be no abatement in the Shia genocide in Pakistan or elsewhere. The instances of Shia genocide in Pakistan include a campaign against Shia doctors that since the 1990s has resulted in the killing of hundreds of them.⁶¹ The persistence of the campaign has led to Shia doctors changing both their own names and the names of their clinics.⁶² Apart from the daily killing of Shias, there are a number of instances where there have been mass killings. Shia people have been taken out of

buses, lined up, and killed by the dozen. As they were shot, the cameramen accompanying the assassins recorded the shooting and then proudly uploaded the footage online. Later the ‘political’ leaders of Deobandi groups proudly referred at public gatherings to the “runs” scored by “our fighters”. The Shias have regularly been killed while participating in their mourning processions and even funeral processions (see, e.g., Hassan, 29 December 2009; Kan, 4 September 2010; Qasimi, 7 February 2012; Qureshi, 22 November 2012).

DEOBANDIS

In this chapter I have used the word “Deobandi” to identify the Shia killers. Almost without exception it is the Deobandi sect of Sunni Islam which has been killing the Shias in Pakistan. The Taliban, the SSP, the ASWJ, the LeJ, Jundullah, and the JM are all Deobandi.⁶³ The LeJ, the main culprit, is an affiliate of Al-Qaeda.⁶⁴ All of these groups are officially banned, but are allowed to take part in politics, run for parliamentary seats, and form alliances with major political parties. Those who identify the Shia killers as Sunni deliberately obfuscate the issue to make it look like a Shia–Sunni issue, which is a complete lie. As noted above, the majority of Pakistanis—more than 55 percent of the population—are Barelvi Sunnis, a sub-continental version of the Sufism. They are also routinely killed by the Deobandis.⁶⁵

In Pakistan, more than 90 percent of various acts of terrorism have been committed by Deobandis. Why they have become so powerful is because they are backed by the state of Pakistan and financed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.⁶⁶ An account of the extent of Deobandi terrorism in Pakistan, especially against Shias, is comprehensively recorded and analysed by Hussain (2010) in his doctoral thesis.

Writing in an Indian magazine, Ahmed (20 March 2013) discusses Deobandi fatwas against the Shias:

A number of Deobandi clerical leaders of Pakistan co-signed or confirmed the fatwa against the Shia in 1986. Among them were two well-known names: Muhammad Yusuf Ludhianvi and Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai . . . Fatwas of apostatisation were issued from time to time from all the prominent Deobandi madrasas of Pakistan. Darul Ulum Haqqaniya Akora Khattak of Maulana Samiul Haq (the seminary where the assassins of ex-prime minister Benazir Bhutto have confessed to staying before the attack

on her in 2007) issued its own fatwa of apostatisation of the Shia in 1986 saying that eating food cooked by them, attending their funeral and burying them in Sunni graveyards stood banned. Another fatwa from Jamia Ashrafia Lahore, whose leader Maulana Muhammad Malik Kandhalwi, known to be a relative of general Zia, declared the Shias kafir because “they held that the Quran had been tampered with and gave Hazrat Ali a status equal to Prophet Muhammad, claiming that angel Jibreel [Gabriel] had made a mistake while taking wahi [revelation] to the Prophet”.

Elsewhere, Ahmed (11 March 2014) reproduces the Deobandi fatwa which has been used to kill Shias in Baluchistan:

All Shia are worthy of killing. We will rid Pakistan of unclean people. Pakistan means “land of the pure” and the Shia have no right to live in this country. We have the edict and signatures of revered scholars, declaring the Shia infidels. Just as our fighters have waged a successful jihad against the Shia Hazara in Afghanistan, our mission in Pakistan is the abolition of this impure sect and its followers from every city, every village, and every nook and corner of Pakistan.

As in the past, our successful jihad against the Hazara in Pakistan and, in particular, in Quetta is ongoing and will continue in the future. We will make Pakistan the graveyard of the Shia Hazara and their houses will be destroyed by bombs and suicide-bombers. We will only rest when we will be able to fly the flag of true Islam on this land of the pure. Jihad against the Shia Hazara has now become our duty.

MARXIST RENDITIONS

I am mindful of the fact that some researchers would like to write a Marxist account of the Shia genocide. Some journalists have indeed tried to put a Marxist gloss on it by claiming that in the city of Jang, the working-class Deobandis are killing Shia property owners. However, they cannot even differentiate between peasants and workers. Their journalistic articles are innocent of methodology. Here is one example:

His humble origins have made him anti-feudal and pro-people. He loses no opportunity to criticise the Maliks, the hereditary tribal elders who are traditionally pro-establishment and receive all the benefits doled out by the government. He is keen to highlight the plight of the ordinary tribesmen and motivated to solve the problems confronting the common man. If he

has his way, he would like to rob the rich to pay the poor like a modern-day Robin Hood. That explains the reason for young men, mostly jobless, to flock to his banner and make up bulk of his Lashkar-i-Islam outfit.⁶⁷

This is a description of the notorious bandit-cum-murderer Mangal Bagh, who has not only created a state within a state in the Tirah Valley, but has also been responsible for the killing of hundreds of Barelvi Sunnis who in his opinion were not good Muslims. Bagh took active part in the War Afghanistan. In the Tirah Valley, no woman is allowed to step outside her home. Bagh shut down all of the CD shops in the valley and no one is allowed to have a dish antenna. It is noteworthy that the author of the Bagh description is a much-respected leftist writer. In his quasi-Marxist zeal, he has forgotten that the “young men” who “flock to his banner” are enforcers of the sharia which Bagh has imposed in the valley, and not a leftist, progressive revolution. Often these illiterate “young men” act as judges for the sharia ‘courts’.

I think a Marxist critique of the Shia genocide will not be very convincing. Often, Marxist critiques are non-contextual because they take the notion of class conflict as monolithic. This brings about analytical simplifications. Pakistan’s genocidal mind is intertwined with contemporary (e.g., petrodollars, Wahhabism, and Islam as a failed system) and (trans)historical (Islam in the Indian subcontinent, the British Raj, and the self-hatred of the Muslims of the subcontinent who are not ‘genuine’ Muslims but converts) issues.⁶⁸ I have discussed some of these issues elsewhere.⁶⁹

CONCLUSION

To make them manageable and focused, the definition and the model above have been discussed only with reference to the Shia genocide in Pakistan. I would like to maintain that both the definition and the model can be found useful to understand and analyse other instances of genocide because although every genocide is unique, the “deliberate concealment and or manipulation of facts by the perpetrators is more often the rule than the exception” (Lemarchand 2011, p. vii).

Genocide, as I have indicated above, is a matter of one group’s power over another. Why the pathologically brutal physical treatment and the socioeconomic destruction of the Palestinians and the Shias in Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain is never explored in terms of genocide is because these countries

are the protégés of the West led by the USA. The same observation can be made about many other genocides in Burundi (1972), Eastern Congo (1996–1997), South-West Africa (1904), Australia (1970s), and various regions in Europe (gypsies at different times). Lemarchand (2011) terms these and other genocides “forgotten genocides”. The unchallenged power of the Deobandi groups is possible only if the Deobandis have the backing of the state, especially the Pakistan Army, which is the de facto ruling elite of the country. Apart from the army, the main backers have been Saudi Arabia and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Sharif Group). Research on the Deobandi nexus with these actors can be carried out to find out how national/local and international elements have contributed to making Pakistan a land of genocides.

The electronic media’s construction of Ahmed Ludhianvi⁷⁰ from the chief promoter of the Shia killing to a national political leader is instructive. I remember that when the Geo channel first put Ludhianvi on a talk show, no other guest was willing to sit with him.⁷¹ Now he is an “Islamic scholar” and the voice of the “moderate Sunnis”. The electronic media is now more active than the print media in promoting the Shia genocide. Research on its advocacy of the genocide is urgently needed.

There are enormous ethnographic, ethnomethodological, and phenomenological research possibilities regarding the Shia genocide. How the state of Pakistan has allowed the Deobandis to destroy the inner lives of the Shias has never been explored. Some friends have informed me that some Shia and other persecuted community women were forced into prostitution because their men, the breadwinners, were killed. How Shia orphans end up in the child labour market is another significant issue. Ethnomethodological research on Shia killers and Shia haters will unravel the various assumptions underlying the Shia genocide. I hope someone will do ethnographic and ethnomethodological research in these areas.

NOTES

1. Anser Abbas’ tweets and details of the local newspaper are discussed in Ahmad’s article. Ahmad’s was the only blog which raised the issue of Altaf Hussain’s murder.
2. Interestingly, the Al-Jazeera interview focuses on his disability but does not say a word about his identity or how/why he became disabled.

3. Dr Ali Haider's other son did not join him that morning to attend school because he was sick. Had he been with him, he would have also been killed.
4. I make no claims to have studied genocide-related sources exhaustively. However, none of the sources given in this chapter is based on explicit methodology.
5. The technical name for these functions is "metafunctions".
6. President Roosevelt's loving characterization of Samoza.
7. I refer to two books in this regard: Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) and Hinton (2002).
8. There is one perceptive article on the Shia genocide in Pakistan. See, for example, Hussain (2 May 2014). See also a short report, "Shia genocide: A crisis in Pakistan", by various authors: <https://lubpak.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/UN-Report-3-Shia-Genocide.pdf>.
9. Schabas (2000) and Levene (2005) have the same view about the deliberateness of genocide.
10. Shias are infidels.
11. Mischief.
12. Deserving death.
13. See Kaplan (2013).
14. The wife and mother of Altaf Hussain, who was beheaded by the Deobandis, lost their minds on finding out about him.
15. A great deal of work can possibly be done on this aspect.
16. This is an account of just one example of how the Wahhabis have been destroying Shia lives and possessions.
17. See, for example, Andreopoulos (1997) and Nhema and Zeleza (2008).
18. This is not true, but this is not the place to discuss the issue. Even if it were true, it does not justify killing from any legal or moral point of view.
19. The Shias' quest has historically been one for legitimacy. This is why they have refused to submit to tyrants and usurpers. For details, see, for example, Halm (2007) and (2007).
20. On the history of Shia–Sunni differences, see Hazleton (2009) and Gonzalez (2013).
21. However, if the basis of genocide is racial, there is probably no escape for the victim.
22. I have avoided this term because it is often used in political science as an antonym to "transition". It is also used in the context of business

studies and entrepreneurship. Thus it does not have the gravity and singularity of “obliterative”.

23. This official Deobandi website proudly displays Deobandi fatwas apostatizing the Shias: <http://www.darulifta-deoband.org/>; and <http://www.deoband.org/>.

The most respected official Deobandi website has the following fatwa against the Shias: “Bohras are Shiah. The beliefs and faiths of Shiah found in their books are against the Quran and Hadith. Therefore, they are not Muslims. It is not correct for a Sunni Muslim to get married with a Shiah or Bohra”: <http://www.darulifta-deoband.com/showuserview.do?function=answerView&call=en&id=5192&limit=2&idxpg=0&qry=%3Cc%3EFAB%3C%2Fc%3E%3Cs%3EFLS%3C%2Fs%3E%3Cl%3Een%3C%2Fl%3E>. See more on this website: <http://www.darulifta-deoband.com/>.

24. For details, see Jones (2006), Simon (2007), and Cooper (2009).
25. This is not the place to discuss Partition. However, a note should be made that the violence in undivided India started months before Partition. See, for example, Pandey (2004).
26. I will return to this point in the Chapter 18.
27. See Asian Human Rights Commission’s report of 23 February 2013; Human Rights Watch report of 27 January (2014), Sharma (2005), and Hussain (2007).
28. See also Wilcke (2009).
29. See, for example, Fisher et al. (2002) and Krippner and McIntyre (2003).
30. My discussion in this section and later on in this chapter will, I hope, clarify the issue.
31. Personally, I am not comfortable about separating culture from religion. I should like to argue that religion subverts culture or even destroys it. However, many scholars would like to separate the two. For example, it could be argued that one can practice Indian culture but observe Islamic beliefs which are external to Indian culture. I do not wish to complicate the issue but hope to take it up in another study, which I plan to do with reference to the anthropology of Islam.
32. See Gunter (2009), Hasiotis and Hasiotis (2010), and Gunes (2013).
33. This comes from a number of friends and respondents who participated in those festivals. A view of the media will show that no reference was made to the Shias, though a lot of space was given to pleas to make peace with the Taliban.

34. “Unfortunate disruption: Iranian bookstall closed,” *Dawn*, 10 December 2012: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1061596/unfortunate-disruption-iranian-bookstall-closed>. The report says, “Buckling under [ASWJ’s] pressure, the police confiscated the books while the fair’s organisers closed down the stall.”
35. Ali has given a detailed account of anti-Shia textbooks, which the Shia students are forced to read in the areas where they are in the majority. See Ali (2008), Nayyar and Salim (2003), and Shehzad (2003).
36. See Ahmed (2011).
37. See Jafri (24 September 2013).
38. See Siddiqa (2010).
39. See Scherrer (2003), and Provost and Akhavan (2010).
40. Only a Shia blog has a raised voice for him. See “Forgotten prisoner: 16 years of imprisonment of SMP Chief Ghulam Raza Naqvi,” *Shiite News*, 8 August 2011: <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/pakistan/3330-forgotten-prisoner-16-years-of-imprisonment-of-smp-chief-ghulam-raza-naqvi--shiite-news-exclusive-report>.
41. Thus genocidal violence is considered to be just by the perpetrator and unjust by the victim.
42. These doctrines are (1) belief in the oneness/unity of God; (2) belief in the existence of the angels; (3) belief in the prophets of God; (4) belief in the scriptures; and (5) belief in the Day of Judgement. All Muslim scholars belonging to any school of thought in Islam accept that these are the only five doctrines basic to becoming Muslim. Thus the Shias claim that since they, like the rest of the Muslims in the world, follow the five fundamental tenets of Islam, they are Muslim.
43. This issue has been taken up in another chapters of this book.
44. “Shia” means “a partisan”. With reference to Islam, it means “the Partisan of Ali bin Abu Talib”.
45. Again, the reader is referred to the following Deobandi websites, where they can read anti-Shia fatwas: <http://www.darulifta-deoband.org/>; and <http://www.deoband.org/>.
46. Read an account of the Theri massacre Alo (28 May 2013). The article also reproduces the reporting of the massacre quoted in this section. There is a link in the article to a short documentary which gives details of the Theri massacre.
47. To give a few examples, these Shia killings were never reported by the media:

“3 More Shias Shot Martyred In Pakistan,” *Shia Post*, 23 April 2014: <http://en.shiapost.com/2014/04/23/3-more-shias-martyred-in-pakistan/>.

“Shia Advocate Ghulam Abid Attacked In Shikarpur,” *Shia Post*, 23 April 2014: <http://en.shiapost.com/2014/04/23/shia-advocate-ghulam-abid-attacked-in-shikarpur/>.

“Shia Youth Shot Martyred In Takfiri Terrorist Attack In Karachi,” *Shia Post*, 22 April 2014: <http://en.shiapost.com/2014/04/22/shia-youth-shot-martyred-in-takfiri-terrorist-attack-in-karachi/>.

“Another Professor Shot Martyred By ASWJ-LeJ Terrorist In Karachi,” *Shia Post*, 21 April 2014: <http://en.shiapost.com/2014/04/21/another-professor-shot-martyred-by-aswj-lej-terrorist-in-karachi/>.

“Shiite Man Shot Martyred In Karachi,” *Shia Post*, 21 April 2014: <http://en.shiapost.com/2014/04/21/shiite-man-shot-martyred-in-karachi/>.

“One Martyred, Another Critically Injured By ASWJ Terrorists In Karachi,” *Shia Post*, 17 April 2014: <http://en.shiapost.com/2014/04/17/one-martyred-another-critically-injured-by-aswj-terrorists-in-karachi/>.

“Two Shiites Shot Martyred In Quetta,” *Shia Post*, 12 April 2014: <http://en.shiapost.com/2014/04/12/two-shiites-shot-martyred-in-quetta/>.

“Shia Taxi Driver Shot Martyred In Takfiri Terrorist Attack Near Parachinar,” *Shia Post*, 10 April 2014: <http://en.shiapost.com/2014/04/10/shia-taxi-driver-shot-martyred-in-takfiri-terrorist-attack-near-parachinar/>.

“Two Shiites Including A Shia Lawyer Shot Martyred In Karachi,” 10 April 2014: <http://en.shiapost.com/2014/04/10/shia-lawyer-shot-martyred-in-karachi/>.

“Shia Doctor Haider Raza Shot Martyred In Karachi,” *Shia Post*, 9 April 2014: <http://en.shiapost.com/2014/04/09/shia-doctor-dr-haider-raza-shot-martyred-in-karachi/>.

48. He was Lahore’s top lawyer and at one time served as the president of the Lahore chapter of the Pakistan ML, Pagara-Juneo Group.
49. Allama Nasir Abbas was a scholar and a *noba* (elegy) reciter par excellence. He was one of the few Shia scholars who did not wear the Iraqi-Iranian style of clothing; he wore Pakistani dress all the time. He described himself as a “cultural Shia”.

50. He was the author of more than 50 books on literary criticism. He was a poet and fiction writer too. Newspapers reported his murder but without telling the readers that he was killed because he was a Shia. The newspapers also did not tell their readers that the LeJ had accepted responsibility said that more Shias would be killed. See, for example, “City mourns Dr Shabih’s murder,” *The Nation*, 20 May 2012: <http://www.nation.com.pk/lahore/20-May-2012/city-mourns-dr-shabih-s-murder>. *The Nation* report says, “According to details, four masked men riding two motorbikes gunned down Dr Shabihul Hasan by spraying straight bullets on various parts of his body while he was riding his motorcar (LEF-4458) on Friday night. Paramedical staff said that two bullets claimed his life that pierced into his heart and kidney. Shariful Hassan, brother of the deceased professor, alleged that his brother was killed by terrorists.”
51. A poet, a reciter of epic poetry, and former principal of Liquatabad College, Karachi.
52. One of the most highly respected and capable legal experts in the Sindh province.
53. He was a professor at the Government College of Technology, Karachi. Not a word was recorded about him in any mainstream newspaper or on any television channel. Only a Shia blog reported his murder. See “Another Professor Shot Martyred By ASWJ-LeJ Terrorist In Karachi,” *Shia Post*, 21 April 2014: <http://en.shiapost.com/2014/04/21/another-professor-shot-martyred-by-aswj-lej-terrorist-in-karachi/>.
54. A lecturer at NED University in Karachi. The murder of this young Shia intellectual also went unreported. See “Engineer Muhammad Yousuf Shot Martyred In Karachi,” *Shia Post*, 13 April 2014: <http://en.shiapost.com/2014/04/13/engineer-muntazir-mehdi-shot-martyred-in-karachi/>.
55. While reporting his death, *Dawn* did not identify his Shia identity. He was simply referred to as “a religious scholar”. See “Religious scholar shot dead in Karachi,” *Dawn*, 27 February 2014: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1089836/religious-scholar-shot-dead-in-karachi>.
56. A partial list of the prominent Shias killed can be found at <http://lubpak.com/archives/132675>.
57. I want to put this on record: this part of my discussion is completely inspired by Perez (2012).

58. It is no coincidence that, in Karachi, Shias have traditionally been referred to as *khatmal* (bedbugs).
59. The compilation can be accessed at <https://lubpak.com/archives/132675>.
60. A separate study is required to deal with this issue. I have collected data on it and hope to be able to publish my findings in the future. As a sampler, the reader is directed to an article written by Jibran Nasir, Pakistan's well-known human rights campaigner. This was written about a boy who survived a suicide attack on the Hazara Shias in Quetta. He lost many of his friends and relatives in the attack. All the people named by Nasir in his article are Shia. However, he refers to them by their first name only, thus concealing their Shia identity. See Nasir, Jibran (4 February 2014). Karachi embraced Ibtihaj with love and support but will you do the same, Bilawal Bhutto? *Express Tribune*: <http://blogs.tribune.com.pk/story/20888/karachi-embraced-ibtihaj-with-love-and-support-but-will-you-do-the-same-bilawal-bhutto/>.
61. Some of the murders have been chronicled at <https://lubpak.com/archives/tag/shia-doctors>.
62. See, for example, Baloch Saher (31 July 2010) and "Karachi's doctors live in fear after spike in deadly attacks" (16 June 2015). *Dawn*.
63. I should like to point out that it is not possible that every Deobandi wants to kill Shias. However, I can safely say that many of the Deobandis who do not subscribe to the Shia genocide still believe that the Shias are a heretical or deviant community.
64. Pakistan: The militant jihadi challenge, International Crisis Group, *Asia Report No. 164*, 13 March 2009.
65. This is not a research work about the Barelvi–Deobandi issue. The Deobandis have persistently attacked Sunni Barelvi/Sufi leaders and shrines. The high-profile Barelvi leader Mufti Naeemi was killed by a suicide bomber sent by the Taliban. See "Suicide bomber kills anti-Taliban cleric Allama Naeemi," *Dawn*, 13 June 2009: <http://www.dawn.com/news/848443/suicide-bomber-kills-anti-taliban-cleric-allama-naeemi>. The Sunni Barelvis also claim that the Deobandis wiped out their Karachi leadership in 2006. See "Bomb carnage at Karachi prayers," *BBC News*, 11 April 2006: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4900402.stm.
66. "US embassy cables: Hillary Clinton says Saudi Arabia 'a critical source of terrorist funding,'" *The Guardian*, 5 December 2010:

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/242073>.

Walsh, Declan. "Hillary Clinton memo highlights Gulf states' failure to block funding for groups like al-Qaida, Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba," *The Guardian*, Monday 6 December 2010: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/05/wikileaks-cables-saudi-terrorist-funding>.

Cartalucci, Tony, "Destroying a nation state: US-Saudi funded terrorists sowing chaos in Pakistan," *Global Research*, 24 December 2013: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/destroying-a-nation-state-us-saudi-funded-terrorists-sowing-chaos-in-pakistan/5323295>.

67. Yusufzai (11 May 2008).
68. Manzoor (1993) discusses why Pakistani Muslims are *number do* Muslims, which means "bogus/fake". Also see, Ahmad (1978) and Ahmed (2004).
69. Zaidi (2011).
70. And his Shia-apostatizing ideology.
71. It was Saleem Safi's "Jirga". See <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=krsIVshLYBM>.

REFERENCES

- Ahmad, I. (1978). *Caste and social stratification among Muslims in India*. New Delhi: Manohar.
- Ahmad, L. (2013, December 21). Pakistani media ignores Altaf Hussain Durrani, a Shia police officer beheaded and cut up by Deobandi terrorists. *Let Us Build Pakistan*. <http://lubpak.com/archives/298799>
- Ahmed, K. (2011). *Sectarian war: Pakistan's Sunni-Shia violence and its link with the Middle East*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ahmed, K. (2013, March 30). Sectarian violence in Pakistan. *Economic and Political Weekly*. <http://www.epw.in/commentary/sectarian-violence-pakistan.html>
- Ahmed, K. (2014, March 11). Hunting the Hazaras. *Newsweek Pakistan*. <http://newsweekpakistan.com/hunting-the-hazara/>
- Ahmed, M. (2004). *Faisalabad Division ke Siasat per Biradarism kay Asraat [Effects of the caste system on the politics of Faisalabad]*. Unpublished PhD thesis, Department of Political Science, B Z University, Multan.
- Ali, N. (2008). Outrageous state, sectarianized citizens: Deconstructing the 'Textbook Controversy' in the Northern Areas, Pakistan. *South Asian Multidisciplinary Academic Journal*. Url: <http://samaj.revues.org/1172> Accessed on 16 August 2016. DOI : 10.4000/samaj.1172. Online since 31 December 2008, connection on 16 August 2016.

- Alo M. (2013, May 28). 50th anniversary of the Theri Massacre. *Let Us Build Pakistan.* <http://lubpak.com/archives/266633>
- Andreopoulos, G. J. (Ed.). (1997). *Genocide: Conceptual and historical dimensions*. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Baloch, Saher. (2010, July 31). Surgical strikes. *Newline.* <http://www.news-linemagazine.com/2010/07/surgical-strikes/>
- Brass, P. (2003). The partition of India and retributive genocide in the Punjab, 1946–47: Means, methods, and purposes. *Journal of Genocide Research*, 5(1), 71–101.
- Card, C. (2003). Genocide and social death. *Hypatia*, 18(1), 63–79.
- Chalk, F., & Jonassohn, K. (1990). *The history and sociology of genocide*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Charny, I. W. (1997). Towards a generic definition of genocide. In G. J. Andreopoulos (Ed.), *Genocide: Conceptual and historical dimensions* (pp. 64–94). Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Chomsky, N., & Dietrich, H. (1999). *Latin America: From colonization to globalization*. Minneapolis: Ocean Press.
- Chomsky, N. (2013). *The essential Chomsky*. New York: The New Press.
- Clastres, P. (1994). *Archaeology of violence* (J. Herman, Trans.). New York: Semiotext(e).
- Coll, S. (2005). *Ghost wars: The secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden*. London: Penguin.
- Cooper, A. D. (2009). *The geography of genocide*. New York: University Press of America.
- Crilly, R. (2013, September 10). Only in Pakistan can the Taliban be described as ‘stakeholders’. *Daily Telegraph Blog.* <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/rob-crilly/100235192/only-in-pakistan-can-the-taliban-be-described-as-stakeholders/>
- Dabag, M. (2005). Modern societies and collective violence: The framework of interdisciplinary genocide studies. In G. C. Kinloch & R. P. Mohan (Eds.), *Genocide: Approaches, case studies, and responses* (pp. 52–62). New York: Algora Publishing.
- Drost, P. (1959). *The crime of state* (Vol. 2). Leyden: A.W. Sythoff.
- Esparza, M., Huttenbach, H. R., & Feierstein, D. (2009). *State violence and genocide in Latin America: The Cold War years*. London: Routledge.
- Fatah, T. (2008). *Chasing the mirage: The tragic illusion of an Islamic state*. Mississauga: John Wiley & Sons Canada.
- Firdous, K. (2009). Militancy in Pakistan. *Strategic Studies* 30 (2): 50–59.
- Fisher, A. T., Sonn, C. C., & Bishop, B. J. (2002). *Psychological sense of community: Research, applications, and implications*. London: Springer.
- Forgotten prisoner: 16 years of imprisonment of SMP Chief Ghulam Raza Naqvi. (2011, August 8). *Shiite News.* <http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/>

- pakistan/3330-forgotten-prisoner-16-years-of-imprisonment-of-smp-chief-ghulam-raza-naqvi--shiite-news-exclusive-report-
- Gellately, R., & Kiernan, B. (Eds.). (2003). *The spectre of genocide: Mass murder in historical perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ghani, F. (2014, February 10). The pain of being disabled in Pakistan. *Al-Jazeera*. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/02/pain-being-disabled-pakistan-2014249751959749.html>
- Gonzalez, N. (2013). *The Sunni-Shia conflict: Understanding sectarian violence in the Middle East*. Orange County: East Nortia Media Ltd.
- Gunes, C. (2013). *The Kurdish national movement in Turkey: From protest to resistance*. London: Routledge.
- Gunter, M. M. (2009). *The A to Z of the Kurds*. New York: Scarecrow Press.
- Halliday, M. A. K. (1994). *Introduction to functional grammar*. London: Arnold.
- Halliday, M. A. K. (1971/1996). Linguistic function and literary style: An inquiry into the language of William Golding's The Inheritors. In J. J. Weber (Ed.), *The stylistics reader: From Roman Jakobson to the present* (pp. 56–86). London: Arnold.
- Halm, H. (2007). *The Shiites: A short history*. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers.
- Harrod, R. P., Lienard, P., & Martin, D. L. (2012). Deciphering violence in past societies. In D. L. Martin, R. P. Harrod, & V. R. Perez (Eds.), *The bioarchaeology of violence* (pp. 63–80). Gainesville: University of Florida Press.
- Hasiotis, A. C., & Hasiotis, A. C. (2010). *The axis of shame: Great Britain, Israel, the United States and Turkey in the Middle East*. Pittsburgh: Dorrance Publishing.
- Hassan, A. (2009, December 29). Suicide bomber kills 30 on Shia procession in Karachi. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/28/pakistan-suicide-attack-kills-30>
- Hazleton, L. (2009). *After the Prophet: The epic story of the Shia-Sunni split in Islam*. New York: Random House.
- Hinton, A. L. (2002a). The dark side of modernity. In A. L. Hinton (Ed.), *Annihilating the difference: The anthropology of genocide* (pp. 1–40). Berkley: University of California Press.
- Hinton, A. L. (Ed.). (2002b). *Annihilating difference: The anthropology of genocide*. Berkley: University of California Press.
- Hinton, A. L., & O'Neill, K. L. (Eds.). (2009). *Genocide: Truth, memory, and representation*. London: Duke University Press.
- Hussain, S. E. (2010). *Terrorism in Pakistan: Incident patterns, terrorists' characteristics, and the impact of terrorist arrests on terrorism*. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania. The thesis is available online at: <http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/136>

- Hussain, W. (2014, May 2). Early warning signs of Shia genocide in Pakistan. *The Diplomat*. <http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/early-warning-signs-of-shia-genocide-in-pakistan/>
- Hussain, Z. (2007). *Frontline Pakistan: The struggle with militant Islam*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Jafri, N. (2013, September 24). *Sectarianism in Pakistan: School textbooks and national identity*. http://muftah.org/sectarianism-in-pakistan-school-textbooks-national-identity/#.UkjGgdwqY_k.facebook
- Jones, A. (2006). *Genocide: A comprehensive introduction*. London: Routledge.
- Kaplan, S. (2013). Child survivors of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and trauma-related affect. *Journal of Social Issues*, 69, 92–110.
- Karachi's doctors live in fear after spike in deadly attacks. (2015, June 16). *Dawn*. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1188546>
- Khan, B. (2010, September 4). Pakistan suicide bomber kills 43 in Shia parade backing Palestinians. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/03/pakistan-suicide-bombers-kill-44-at-parade>
- Krippner, S., & McIntyre, T. M. (2003). *The Psychological impact of war trauma on civilians: An international perspective*. Westport: Greenwood.
- Lemarchand, R. (Ed.). (2011). *Forgotten genocides: Oblivion, denial, and memory*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Levene, M. (2005). *The meaning of genocide*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- May, L. 2010. *Genocide: A normative account*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Manzoor, A. M. (1993). *The Pakistan problem: Historical background of Punjab and consolidation of Pakistan*. Lahore: The Frontier Post Press.
- Martin, J. R., & Rose, R. (2003). *Working with discourse: Meaning beyond the clause*. London: Continuum.
- Melson, R. (1992). *Revolution and genocide: On the origins of the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Ignatieff, M. (2001, February 26). Lemkin's words. *The New Republic*.
- Nayyar, A. H., & Salim, A. (Eds.). (2003). *The subtle subversion: The state of curricula and textbooks in Pakistan, Urdu, English, social studies and civics*. Islamabad: Sustainable Development Policy Institute.
- Nhema, A. G., & Zeleza, T. (2008). *The roots of African conflicts: The causes and costs*. Ohio: Ohio University Press.
- Pakistan: Shia genocide: Military and militants. (2013, February 23). *Asian Human Rights Commission*. <http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-ART-021-2013>
- Pandey, G. (2004). *Remembering partition: Violence, nationalism and history in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Perez, V. R. (2012). The politicization of the dead. In D. L. Martin, R. P. Harrod, & V. R. Perez (Eds.), *The bioarchaeology of violence* (pp. 13–28). Gainesville: University of Florida Press.
- Provost, R., & Akhavan, P. (Eds.). (2010). *Confronting genocide*. London: Springer.
- Qasimi, H. (2012, February 7). Pakistani extremists film massacre of Shiite minority group. *The Observers*. <http://observers.france24.com/en/20120702-pakistan-quetta-extremists-film-massacre-shiite-minority-group-hazara>
- Qureshi, A. (2012, November 22). Pakistan Taliban suicide bomber kills 23 in Rawalpindi. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/22/pakistan-taliban-suicide-bomber-rawalpindi>
- Rosen, N. (2006). *In the belly of the green bird: The triumph of the martyrs in Iraq*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Rubenstein, W. D. (2004). *Genocide: A history*. New York: Pearson Education Limited.
- Schabas, W. (2000). *Genocide in international law: The crimes of crimes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Scheper-Hughes, N., & Lock, M. M. (1987). The mindful body: A prolegomena to future work in medical anthropology. *Medical Anthropology Quarterly*, 1(1), 6–41.
- Scherrer, C. P. (2003). *Ethnicity, nationalism, and violence: Conflict management, human rights, and multilateral regimes*. London: Ashgate.
- Sharma, D. P. (2005). *The new terrorism: Islamist International*. Delhi: APH Publishing.
- Shaw, M. (2003). *War and genocide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shehzad, M. (2003). Textbook controversy in Gilgit. *The Friday Times*, XV, p. 19.
- Siddiq, A. (2010). *Red hot chilli peppers Islam—Is the youth in elite universities in Pakistan radical?* Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Foreign-Security Policy Paper, p. 24.
- Simon, T. W. (2007). *The laws of genocide: Prescriptions for a just world*. Oxford: Greenwood.
- Smith, C. (2010). *What is a person?* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Thackrah, J. R. (2004). *Dictionary of terrorism*. London: Routledge.
- Unfortunate disruption: Iranian bookstall closed. (2012, December 10). *Dawn*. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1061596/unfortunate-disruption-iranian-bookstall-closed>
- US Embassy cables: Hillary Clinton says Saudi Arabia ‘a critical source of terrorist funding. (2010, December 5). *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/242073>
- Waller, J. (2007). *Becoming evil: How ordinary people commit genocide and mass killing*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Walsh, D. (2006, December 6). Hillary Clinton memo highlights Gulf states' failure to block funding for groups like al-Qaida, Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/05/wikileaks-cables-saudi-terrorist-funding>
- Wilcke, C. (2009). *Denied dignity: Systematic discrimination and hostility toward Saudi Shia citizens*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Yusufzai, R. (2008, May 11). The man from Bara. *The News*. <http://jang.com.pk/thenews/may2008-weekly/nos-11-05-2008/dia.htm>
- Zaidi, A. (2011). Postcolonial insanity. *Journal of Postcolonial Cultures and Societies*, 2(4), 1–29.